Wake up（86）

 

Chapter 16 Crisis

 

86

 

Perseverance is the national spirit that the Chinese call for, and a broad mind is still a harbor for the Chinese to rest. The Chinese people have never forgotten the earnest teachings of those political figures. Although the passing of the Cultural Revolution years made those old people with frost on their temples deeply moved, there were curses and nostalgia. Time can take away everything. Years and months will change your name, appearance, character, and destiny. Time will also change the fate of the country. Time will pass by in a hurry, but memories will always exist.

There is no two mornings in a day, and the time does not come again. Many things that we thought we would never forget in our lifetime are forgotten by us in the days we never forget. For example, in the history of the Cultural Revolution, most people expressed their hatred and anger, but a few people still cherished it and hoped that the Cultural Revolution would be revived. Some even put on green military uniforms, sang red songs, and danced red dances. No one said it was against the law. .

However, Li Dao Dao seems to represent a different kind of mentality. When investigating the history of the Cultural Revolution, he must find out the truth before he can express his grievances.

The Cultural Revolution was an unbearable nightmare for the Chinese people in the 20th century. What happened to the Cultural Revolution? How did it happen? How should we understand it and judge it? Will it happen again? So far, there are different opinions on the answers, and these questions are still shrouded in a veil of mystery.

The Cultural Revolution - Mao Zedong's comprehensive suppression of the political backlash caused by his own major decision-making mistakes and "wrong line"; Mao Zedong established a new balance at the core of party power and reshuffled the composition of party and government power at all levels across the country an attempt at playing cards; a nationwide political upheaval and social disaster caused by the supreme leader of a one-party regime to maintain his supreme power. The causes and process of the Cultural Revolution were very complicated, with many inevitable and accidental factors mixed together, but the formation of its general historical context was determined by a series of actions taken by Mao Zedong to relieve the power crisis he faced in the party. Following this thread, we may be able to find the inner historical trajectory of the Cultural Revolution.

After the Lushan Conference in the summer of 1959, Mao Zedong continued to experiment with the evil results caused by the "three red flags" all the way, and it came to an end at the Seven Thousand People Conference in early 1962.

The meeting of 7,000 people was held against the background that 20 million people starved to death across the country, the output of major products such as steel, grain, cotton, and coal, and various indicators of the national economy dropped sharply. The original intention of the Congress was to address the looming problem of famine. Such a central working conference, which extended the participants to county party committee secretaries and party secretaries of important factories and mines, must not only solve the problems of "decentralization" and "standardism" under the central government. Reflecting on the evil consequences caused by the "Three Red Flags", it must resolve the issue of who bears the responsibility for these serious evil consequences. At the same time, it must come up with a complete thinking and method to get rid of the predicament and seek development.

Faced with these unavoidable problems, Mao Zedong was indeed clear-headed. He knew very well that tens of millions of people died of starvation across the country, and there were such vicious events as the "Xinyang Incident" that almost all women wore white shoes, and even "cannibalism". As Liu Shaoqi said, in China's feudal society Those who want to "send a letter" and those who want to "send the crime". As the instigator of this series of huge disasters, as the supreme leader of the entire party, he undoubtedly bears the main responsibility that cannot be shirked.

The question is, in what way and to what extent did Mao Zedong shoulder these responsibilities, how did other people in the party core view his mistakes and responsibilities, and what did the leaders at all levels of the party think, in order to "correct" Among these mistakes, Mao Zedong had no idea what people would think, how to do, and how to treat him.

Mao Zedong was Mao Zedong after all. He does not want to cover up or cover up these sharp and unavoidable contradictions and problems, he does not want the Congress of Seven Thousand People to go through the motions in the direction of solving the so-called problems of decentralization and centralization, he does not want to deceive himself and others, he wants to completely solve these problems figure out. Of course, these thoughts of Mao Zedong probably became clear quickly after reading the first two parts of the draft report of the conference that was hastily sent to him for review before the meeting.

This report was drafted by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, and a special drafting team was set up for this purpose. How to write this report? In fact, at the small central working meeting on December 20 before the congress, Mao Zedong set the tone for the congress, and of course he also set the tone for the report. What kind of tone is this? That is to say, the situation is basically good, mistakes are being corrected, and it is better than last year. The past experience and lessons mainly have a general line, but lack a complete set of specific policies. In other words, the correctness of the three red flags cannot be doubted; The central government should take responsibility first, followed by provincial, prefectural, and county committees.

It can be seen that according to this tone, the evil consequences caused by the experiment of the three red flags will not rise to the height of the wrong line, and Mao Zedong's supremacy in the party will not be shaken. This is the bottom line that Mao Zedong insisted on. As long as this bottom line is not broken, Mao Zedong will sooner or later prepare to retreat across the board. He not only wants the central government to bear the responsibility for the serious mistakes caused by the three red flags, but also prepares to bear the main responsibility. If he does not do this, he will not be able to If we continue to maintain the authority and prestige in the party, we will not be able to win the trust of the party members and grassroots cadres in the party. Mao Zedong is very clear about the pros and cons. On the one hand, he blew the wind to the members of the Standing Committee, the Politburo, and the secretaries of the provincial party committee, set the tone, and showed his "bottom line." On the other hand, he was preparing to retreat to the maximum and take the initiative to take responsibility. With room for maneuver, he is no longer worried that the conference report will go against the tone he set, and he no longer worries that the conference will deviate from the expected track.

Of course, in general, the report did not break through Mao Zedong's bottom line, and was drafted in accordance with Mao's tone, but there were some ambiguous inclinations in the consideration of some of the "key words", and some ambiguous intentions that were difficult to distinguish. Mao Zedong was surprised and disturbed.

And all of this is related to Liu Shaoqi's "tough" attitude in presiding over the drafting of the report. In the drafting of the report, Liu Shaoqi was uncharacteristically demanding many times that the report should "tell enough about the achievements and fully explain the shortcomings", emphasizing that "tell as much as possible about the mistakes and shortcomings of the past four years, speak freely, don't hesitate,...be vigorous Medicine", and pointed out that the mistakes of the four years were related to the excessive struggle within the party since the Lushan Conference in 1959, the lack of democratic life, and only criticizing the right but not the left.

Liu Shaoqi's attitude was reflected in the first draft of the report, and there were the following "notes" that were not in harmony with Mao Zedong's "tune": For example, the achievements since the "Great Leap Forward" were not highlighted or mentioned separately; All since the "Great Leap Forward" and so on. According to Mao Zedong's keen political sense honed over the years of political struggle, although he could not find any obvious "big mistakes", he could smell the seriousness of the situation and had an ominous premonition of "fire in the backyard". Therefore, Mao Zedong decided to submit the report to the General Assembly for discussion.

Judging from Mao Zedong’s consistent thinking and style formed since the Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957 and the Lushan Conference in 1959, Mao Zedong may have the following mentality in making this decision: First, the discordant “notes” that appeared in the first draft of the report could never limit the Because of the ideas of individual members of the Politburo Standing Committee, it must have a considerable market among cadres at all levels within the party. Only by clarifying the true thoughts of cadres at all levels within the party can we make corresponding countermeasures to stick to the "bottom line"; Second, just solving the ideological differences of a few members of the Standing Committee or the Politburo at the core level of the Central Committee cannot fundamentally solve the problem, and even cause dissatisfaction among the majority of party members and cadres. On the contrary, if the opinions of most of the participants support his ideological line, then this will have the effect of drawing the fire from the bottom of the fire against the opposition of a few people in the central core. Mao Zedong firmly believed in the "foolish loyalty" of the vast majority of the participants and the support of leading cadres at all levels within the party. This kind of support from the middle and high-level cadres in the party, regardless of the central core, is also one of Mao Zedong's unique political strategies. Third, asking the Standing Committee members to express their opinions one by one after the majority of the participants have fully expressed their opinions is the best opportunity to find out their true ideological status and true political stance. Find out the "enemy situation" and distinguish "friend and foe", and everything will be easy.

At the meeting of 7,000 people, no matter what happens, Mao Zedong only intends to retreat, not to "attack", retreat, and retreat enough, on the one hand, this is "atonement" for his major mistakes, and on the other hand, it is to continue to win the trust of party members The price that cadres must pay, on the other hand, is the concession that must be made to stick to their political bottom line.

Memories, piece by piece withered. The confused world of mortals, the past like smoke, like the bleak autumn wind, holding the leaves of memories. The memory of this period of history is like a mirror, but this memory is only a helpless and confusing memory.