Wake up（208）

 

208

 

When Zhou Jianguo, Pan Guangfu, and Chai Jianmin continued to chat about what happened in Anqing during the Cultural Revolution, they had to talk about Li Desheng when they talked about these things.

Li Desheng, born in 1916, is from Xin County, Henan Province. Joined the Red Army in 1930, joined the Communist Youth League in 1931, and transferred to the Communist Party of China in 1932. Participated in the Long March, served as a division traffic team member, party branch secretary, and political instructor. During the Anti-Japanese War, he served as company commander, battalion commander, and regiment commander in the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army. During the War of Liberation, he served as the brigade commander and division commander of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army and the Second Field Army. He served as the division commander and deputy commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. In 1954, he served as the first deputy commander and chief of staff of the 12th Army. In the following year, he served as army commander and was awarded the rank of major general. Graduated from the Higher Military Academy in 1960.

In 1962, it was Li Baohua, son of Li Dazhao, who succeeded Zeng Xisheng as Secretary of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee. This approach laid the groundwork for later conflicts. After the Cultural Revolution, this contradiction began to intensify. In 1967, the Hefei Revolutionary Rebel Joint Committee had a fierce conflict due to the "1.26" seizure of power, which eventually turned into a violent struggle. After the central government abolished the "1st, 26th" authority, Qian Jun, who was the commander of the 60th Army at the time, led the 60th Army into Anhui and served as the director of the Military Management Committee. In 1967, the central government transferred the 12th Army into Anhui to participate in the work of "three branches and two armies", and Li Desheng, the commander of the army, served as the director of the Military Management Committee.

In 1968, due to conflicts between the two factions, Anhui fell into a state of "comprehensive seizure of power" and "comprehensive civil war". Large-scale armed struggles occurred in Wuhu, Anqing, Huainan, Huaibei and other places in Anhui. Li Desheng personally climbed a ladder to negotiate with the rebels. At that time, slogans such as "Down with Li Desheng!" and "Down with Song Peizhang!" were everywhere in Anhui.

With the efforts of the Left Army of the 12th Army branch headed by Li Desheng, the Revolutionary Committee of Anhui Province was established in April 1968. The newly established Provincial Revolutionary Committee combined two former provincial cadres as deputy directors. One was Li Renzhi (1919-1983), the former Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee Secretariat. also preserved. The other is Yang Xiaochun, who was attacked by Zeng Xisheng in 1957. He was rehabilitated after Li Baohua came to Anhui, and served as a member of the Standing Committee of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee and Secretary of the Hefei Municipal Party Committee on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. This approach reflects the level of equality between the cadres of the two factions, and has been affirmed by the Central Committee and praised by Mao Zedong. In fact, the conflict between the cadres of the two factions has lasted for a long time. In fact, there are many problems in the Anhui Branch of the Twelfth Army, which are related to several major armed incidents.

Li Desheng was originally a typical military cadre that Mao Zedong liked very much to support the Cultural Revolution movement. In 1967, Li Desheng served as the commander of the 12th Army of the People's Liberation Army in Anhui Province, and was praised by Lao Mao. In 1968, Li Desheng became the director of the Revolutionary Committee of Anhui Province. In 1969, Li Desheng became an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and in 1970 he became the director of the General Political Bureau of the People's Liberation Army.

In 1969, Li Desheng was transferred to Beijing. Although he still served as the top leader in Anhui, the specific work was in charge of the political commissar Song Peizhang. Song Peizhang was included in the "Gang of Four" group in 1977 after the Cultural Revolution, and was isolated and reviewed, and all positions inside and outside the party were dismissed. The reason is said to be that he worked hard in "criticizing Deng Deng and countering the right-leaning style of overturning the verdict", and he was identified as the agent of the "Gang of Four" in Anhui.

In late December 1970, Li Desheng, who was assigned to work in Anhui, suddenly received a notice from the General Office of the Central Committee and flew back to Beijing. Mao Zedong met him and asked him to be the commander of the Beijing Military Region. member, member of the Central Military Commission's working group, director of the General Political Department, deputy commander of the Nanjing Military Region, commander of the 12th Army, first secretary of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee of the Communist Party of China, director of the Revolutionary Committee of Anhui Province, and commander of the Anhui Provincial Military Region), he proposed to Mao Zedong : "Do you still care about the affairs of the General Political Department?" Mao Zedong said very simply that he must take care of it, and asked him to do a good job in the role of the General Political Department in "undertaking approval".

Li Desheng is not a member of Lin Biao's faction, but he is cautious in his words and deeds on weekdays, keeping a certain distance from Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and other Cultural Revolution ultra-leftists, and has a good relationship with the Military Commission's working group.

During the Chen Criticism and Rectification Movement in 1971, Li Desheng was used by Mao Zedong as a pawn to "poach the wall" and replace Zheng Weishan as the commander of the Beijing Military Region. Later, during the "September 13 Incident", he represented Zhou Enlai in the Air Force and directly handled the escape of Lin Biao's special plane. In the future, Li Desheng even participated in the review of the Lin Biao case by the Central Task Force.

Li Desheng has been trusted by Mao Zedong for a long time. In August 1973, Li Desheng became the vice chairman of the Party Central Committee, the director of the General Political Department and the commander of the Beijing Military Region. He jumped to the top of his life. Obviously, Li Desheng at this time was also trained and reused by Mao Zedong as one of his successors.

But at the end of 1973, Li Desheng was transferred to the Northeast as the commander of the Shenyang Military Region. Why was Li Desheng, who had just been elected vice-chairman of the CPC Central Committee at the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, transferred from Beijing to Shenyang in just four months? Li Desheng himself recalled: "Especially after the 10th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Jiang Qing and others were extremely dissatisfied and hated that I was elected as the vice chairman of the party, but she did not join the Standing Committee...their unreasonable interference in my work was intentional. There are more and more difficulties, conflicts are becoming more and more acute, and struggles are becoming more and more open, until Jiang Qing "set fire to the wilderness" in criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius, publicly named me and criticized me, and proposed "down with the big warlords" to force me to admit it. Lin Biao's "thieves the boat", all his writings are trying to put me in a desperate situation."

Maybe Li Desheng only saw the superficial phenomenon of the problem instead of realizing the deeper reason.

Why did Mao Zedong transfer Li Desheng to the Northeast to serve as the commander of the Shenyang Military Region at this time. This is indeed intriguing. At that time, Mao Zedong implemented the transfer of the commanders of the eight major military regions. In addition to transferring Xu Shiyou, Yang Dezhi, and Han Xianchu from their original military posts, another deeper meaning was aimed at Li Desheng, the commander of the Beijing military region.

Wang Hongwen disclosed the whole story to Qiu Huizuo in Qincheng Prison. Wang Hongwen said: When the party reached the "Ten Ten", Chairman Mao promoted Li Desheng to the vice chairman of the Party Central Committee. threat. At that time we put the relationship between Li Desheng and Lin Biao in front of Chairman Mao and wanted to remove him. Chairman Mao believed that Li Desheng was a representative of the senior cadres of the People's Liberation Army who were able to break through the shackles in the early days of the Cultural Revolution and who were the first to intervene in the Cultural Revolution to support the revolutionary rebellion. Chairman Mao gave Li Desheng a face, asked him to resign himself, and sent him to the Northeast. There are Mao Yuanxin and the others, and Li Desheng "has a job but no power", so he is not afraid of what he will do. But Li Desheng was frightened and accepted obediently, and the matter calmed down.

After all, Li Desheng was a typical example of Mao Zedong's army supporting the Cultural Revolution movement during the Cultural Revolution, and he has always been credited. In Mao Zedong's eyes, Li Desheng had never made a big mistake, and he was not a member of the Lin Biao system, and he was reused by Lao Mao when he brought down the Lin Biao system. Although the extreme leftists of the Cultural Revolution strongly demanded the overthrow of Li Desheng, Mao Zedong considered it more comprehensively and long-term. According to Li Desheng's recollection, Li Desheng was also in a very passive and embarrassing situation in the Shenyang Military Region. Mao Yuanxin, as the political commissar of the Shenyang Military Region, once organized criticism of Li Desheng. Except for some people in the party committee office and security department of the military region, most people kept a distance from Li Desheng. Li Desheng had to go to the grassroots to "squat" or study to pass the time.

Although Li Desheng was driven to Shenyang at the end of 1973, his bad luck did not end. From August 26 to September 10, 1974, Wang Hongwen presided over a meeting of comrades in charge of major military regions at the Jingxi Hotel, and "criticized and helped" Li Desheng, Xu Shiyou, Han Xianchu and others. Li Desheng is "the key point". Wang Hongwen said at the meeting: "With regard to the problems exposed in criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius, the chairman (referring to Mao Zedong) said, 'Except for a few comrades, there are a few comrades who have more or less problems'. This 'more or less' refers to Li Desheng!"

Li Desheng was investigated for the following issues: participating in Lin Biao's first order, destroying black materials of Huang Wu, Li Qiu, Lin Biao's meeting with cadres above the vice minister of the General Political Department on May 19, 1970, commemorating the tenth anniversary of the enlarged meeting of the Military Commission, The issue of the Lushan Conference, the issue of Lin Biao's photo published in the People's Liberation Army Newspaper, the issue of the 1971 cadre work conference, the issue of Lin Liguo's lecture report, the issue of the "Northern Troop Transfer" issue, the issue of helicopter flight in the "913 Incident", the issue of "destroying Huang, Wu, Li , Qiu's black materials", "covering the cover" after the "913 incident", meddling in the general affairs, etc.

At the meeting, Wang Hongwen and Mao Yuanxin put Li Desheng on the line, forcing Li Desheng to conduct a self-criticism and admit his "crime". On September 8, Mao Zedong commented on Li Desheng's review: "I have read it, just change it."

When some commentators talked about the "Gang of Four" and Mao Yuanxin's criticism and attack on Li Desheng, they attributed it to the personal behavior of these people. Including Li Desheng himself believed that the purpose of the "Gang of Four" attacking him was "obviously to open a breakthrough from me and find the 'cannonballs' to attack Premier Zhou and Vice Chairman Ye".

In fact, Mao Zedong was behind the "Gang of Four" and Mao Yuanxin. Without Mao's connivance and permission, how could these people besiege Li Desheng, the vice chairman of the Party Central Committee, Xu Shiyou, Han Xianchu and other commanders of the military region at such a meeting? This is exactly the same as when Zhang Chunqiao, Mao Yuanxin and others besieged and severely criticized the working group of the Military Commission at the National Planning Conference in February 1971. Only by creating a strong momentum and wave of criticism can those criticized be forced to bow their heads and conduct self-criticism, and then organizational measures can be taken Replace these people. This is also the consistent method and strategy Mao Zedong used to deal with his opponents.

In the history of the CCP’s ruling, there has never been a vice-chairman of the Party Central Committee appointed to a local office. Mao Zedong said in a conversation with relevant members of the Politburo on December 14, 1973: "As for Comrade Desheng left, whether he should also concurrently serve as the General Political Department, I said, don't concurrently hold it!"

Mao Zedong dismissed Li Desheng from his position as chief political officer in one sentence, which actually paved the way for Zhang Chunqiao to become chief political officer. As the vice chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Li Desheng can only serve as the commander of the military region in Shenyang, losing the power to work in the central government. Not only that, Mao Zedong wanted to further deprive Li Desheng of his position as vice chairman of the Party Central Committee.

In the autumn and winter of 1974, Ji Dengkui and Li Xiannian were ordered to talk to Li Desheng together. Ji Dengkui said: "Comrade Desheng, you should understand that you are the vice chairman of the Party Central Committee, and we are just members of the Politburo. According to the rules, we are I am not qualified to talk to you about this. It is Chairman Mao's opinion that you should resign."

Now that Mao Zedong had spoken, Li Desheng had no choice but to "voluntarily resign".

At the Second Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee in January 1975, Li Desheng proposed to the Central Committee to resign as a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and vice chairman of the Party Central Committee. In the end, Lao Mao gave instructions: If there are mistakes, it is good to correct them. He agreed to resign as the vice chairman of the party and the member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and to retain the members of the Politburo.

Li Desheng thus became the vice chairman of the Central Committee with the shortest tenure since the founding of the Communist Party of China - only one year and four months.

However, misfortune comes with blessings, and Li Desheng's bad luck was compensated after the "Gang of Four" was smashed, which became a clear proof that Li Desheng was persecuted by the "Gang of Four". During the Cultural Revolution, those who were favored by Lao Mao for promotion eventually resigned, such as Hua Guofeng, Ji Dengkui, Wang Dongxing, Chen Yonggui, Wu Guixian, etc., but Li Desheng was an exception. Member of the Communist Party of China. In 1990, Li Desheng retired from the post of political commissar of the National Defense University.

It is an indisputable fact that Li Desheng rose during the Cultural Revolution, and it is rare for him to be a major general and then an extremely talented official and to be safe and sound after the Cultural Revolution.

There may be several reasons why Deng Xiaoping did not purge Li Desheng after the Cultural Revolution.

The first is that Li Desheng was born in the Second Field Army of Liu Deng's army, the 12th Army is Liu Deng's direct descendant, and the old army commander Wang Jinshan has always been favored by Deng Xiaoping. This can be seen from the fact that Wang Jinshan was transferred from the main army post to the main post in the military region when he passed away.

The second is that after Li Desheng resigned as vice chairman of the Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping took over this position. As far as Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, Kang Sheng, Ye Jianying, and Li Desheng were concerned, the vice-chairmen of the Central Committee at the time, Zhou Enlai was in charge of the daily work of the Central Committee, Wang Hongwen was in charge of training successors, Kang Sheng was in charge of political theory, Ye Jianying was in charge of the army, and Li Desheng was only in charge of military political work. Lacking a vice-chairman in charge, Li De was born and Deng Xiaoping came up, which was in line with China's policy of shifting from political revolution to economic development in the late period of the Cultural Revolution. This kind of personnel arrangement is reasonable. If the issue of Li Desheng is pursued, it will herald the disgrace of Deng Xiaoping's ascension.

The third is that Li Desheng closely followed Zhou Enlai during the Lin Biao incident and became the de facto umbrella. Negating Li Desheng can easily give people the impression that Lin Biao rejected Zhou Enlai.

The fourth is that although Li Desheng actively participated in the factional struggle of the Cultural Revolution, there were many excuses for his military status. Later, he took the initiative to resign and got rid of the suspicion of the Cultural Revolution faction. In the later period of the Cultural Revolution, Li Desheng served as the commander of the Shenyang Military Region. He stayed away from the center where political struggles were fierce, and did not participate in the "counterattack against the Rightist trend of overturning verdicts" and power struggles.

The fifth is that it is easier to explain Li Desheng's position as vice chairman of the Central Committee at the First Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee. Because of the "three-combination of old, middle-aged and young" leadership group advocated at that time, Li Desheng belonged to the "middle" in terms of age, and was a cadre trusted by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai during the Cultural Revolution, which was very reasonable. In fact, Li Desheng's political future was doomed at the end of 1973. When the "commanders of the eight major military regions" were switched in December 1973, Li Desheng, who was the director of the General Political Department and also the commander of the Beijing Military Region, was transferred to the commander of the Shenyang Military Region, and at the same time the director of the General Political Department was removed. It is obviously inappropriate to serve as the vice chairman of the Central Committee as the commander of the large military region. In 1974, the Central Committee did not hold a plenary meeting, and the removal of the vice chairman of the party did not go through organizational procedures. In fact, Li Desheng served as the chairman of the first middle school of the tenth party, and was exempted from the second middle school.

Li Desheng has four points of fame in his life. One is that during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the 35th Division, commanded by Li Desheng, was surrounded by the enemy, and flexibly transferred the entire division to completely retreat from the mountainous area. The 138th Division of the 60th Army, which stuck to the rules, was completely wiped out. The second is that Li Desheng, the deputy commander of the 12th Army, took part in commanding the Battle of Shangganling. The third is that during the Cultural Revolution, he was praised by Mao Zedong in Anhui Zhizuo, and the fourth was that he assisted Zhou Enlai in stabilizing the army during the Lin Biao incident in 1971.

After Li Desheng retired, he and others co-founded the China Patriotic Engineering Federation, a national association aimed at "propagating patriotic spirit, organizing patriotic projects, promoting Chinese culture, and promoting the reunification of the motherland". Association, honorary chairman of the Chinese Wushu Association. He also participated in the research work of the history of the Communist Party of China and the military. He edited "From Guo Xingfu's Teaching Method to Military Training with Science and Technology", and wrote "Li Desheng's Memoirs" and "Military Reflections".

At 15:20 on May 8, 2011, Li Desheng died of illness in Beijing at the age of 96. The official Chinese evaluation of Li Desheng is "an outstanding member of the Communist Party of China, a long-tested and loyal communist fighter, a proletarian revolutionist and military strategist, and an outstanding leader of our party and our army."

Li Desheng's wife, Cao Yunlian, joined the Eighth Route Army at the age of 13. She has two sons and four daughters: sons Li Heping (Secretary General of the Chinese Patriotic Engineering Federation), Li Nanzheng (Vice President of Shijiazhuang Army Command Academy, major general rank), daughters Li Yuanzheng (military doctor), Li Yaya, Li Xiaohu and Li Youyou.

Li Desheng was one of Mao Zedong's loyal close ministers, and he was also one of the few high-level officials who rose to fame during the Cultural Revolution and remained safe and sound after the Cultural Revolution.

When Zhou Jianguo chatted with Pan Guangfu and Chai Jianmin about the events of the Cultural Revolution, they mentioned Li Desheng. At the same time, they talked about another special figure, that is Xu Shiyou, the founding general of the People's Republic of China.