188
Li Tiandao persuaded Chai Jianmin not to return to
the mainland after going to Hong Kong this time. He believes that the Cultural
Revolution may repeat itself in China, and there is no need to suffer again.
Chai Jianmin didn't answer Li Tiandao directly. He
fixed his eyes on He Jiafu: Mr. He, you broke your leg while beating devils.
After I leave, you have to treat yourself well.
He Jiafu said with a smile: Seventy is rare in
life, and we are all in our early 90s. What else is there to be afraid of and
nostalgic for? Let it be whatever day you live.
Lin Huiting agreed with He Jiafu's statement. Lin
Huiting said: I just talked to you about the "three branches and two
armies" in the Cultural Revolution. Now that the country is talking about
national security again, the Cultural Revolution seems to be revived. Those who
sang red songs and danced red dances were all witnesses of the Cultural
Revolution. Some old men even wore red scarves and sang "We are the
successors of communism." I see that there are many disguised "Mao
Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams" active in the streets and squares.
Lin Huiting said, I remembered the investigation of
"May 16th" during the "Cultural Revolution".
On March 27, 1970, the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China issued the "Notice on Cracking Down on the 'May
16th' Counter-Revolutionary Conspiracy Group." The notice stated:
"The May 16th counter-revolutionary conspiracy group, under the control of
the counter-revolutionary double-faced faction Xiao Hua, Yang Chengwu, Yu
Lijin, Fu Chongbi, Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu, rampantly attacked the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, committing heinous crimes." Now it
has been seen It is clear that the accusations made in this document are purely
absurd and fabricated out of thin air. Xiao Hua, Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu
Chongbi were not "counter-revolutionary double-dealers" at all, but
generals who were persecuted during the "Cultural Revolution"; Wang
Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu had nothing to do with the so-called "May 16th
counter-revolutionary clique". The leaders of a
"counter-revolutionary conspiracy group" turned out to be completely
non-existent. Obviously, the real purpose of this investigation of "May
16th" was to go elsewhere. In fact, it was just Lao Mao and the
"Central Cultural Revolution" who refused to speak out.
Lin Huiting said: This document does not clearly
define the standards and boundaries of the "May 16th" elements. At
that time, the higher-ups instructed that anyone with "three points",
that is, pointing the finger at the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman
Mao, pointing at the "three branches and two armies", and pointing at
the behavior of the new "revolutionary committee" must be involved in
this movement. Inventory. The so-called "three-pointing" can actually
be interpreted in countless ways, which makes the investigation very arbitrary;
and the "three-pointing" is different from the previous
"counter-revolutionary" crimes in that it can easily be extended to
" The most active "rebels" in the "Cultural
Revolution". Therefore, it is natural that the spearhead of the
"investigation" campaign was directed at the activists in the early
days of the "Cultural Revolution" among the college students. This movement
was a severe blow to the activists in the early days of the "Cultural
Revolution".
At the
beginning of the "Cultural Revolution", Mao Zedong tried his best to
encourage the students to "rebel" in order to open up the situation;
once Lao Mao achieved his goal, he kicked them away; not only that, but also in
the name of investigating the "May 16 Group" Liquidate the
"rebels". At the beginning of the "investigation", it was
to hold a meeting to expose and create momentum, mainly to expose who
"beaten, smashed and looted" in the early days of the "Cultural
Revolution". Therefore, many activities in response to Mao Zedong and the
"Central Cultural Revolution" in the early days of the "Cultural
Revolution" became "crimes" in 1970. Some people pointed out
that during the "Cultural Revolution", there were three peaks of
deaths due to unjust cases, the third of which was the "cleaning up class
ranks", "one attack and three antis" and the "May
16th" investigation from 1968 to 1970. These three movements were all led
by the "Revolutionary Committee", "Military Propaganda
Team", and "Worker Propaganda Team". Among those who died in
unjust cases during the "Cultural Revolution", most of them died
during this period. They couldn't stand the torture and committed suicide. Some
died of torture, and a few were shot. In this period, there were incidents of
killing people in almost all units, exceeding the sum of other periods. Its
seriousness can be seen even more when it is linked to the situation in the
whole country. Of course, the specific actions of the "Revolutionary
Committee", "Military Propaganda Team", and "Worker
Propaganda Team" of each unit are also very different. For example,
Tsinghua University only arrested one so-called "May 16th member",
and Beijing Institute of Geology did not arrest a single one, while in some
places hundreds of "May 16th members" were arrested. One can imagine.
Lin Huiting said:
In 1981, the official evaluation of the "three
branches and two armies" in the "Resolution on Several Historical
Issues Concerning the Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of
China" was: "Send the People's Liberation Army to implement the three
branches and two armies (supporting the left, supporting workers, supporting
agriculture, military management, and military training. ), which was necessary
in the chaotic situation at the time, played a positive role in stabilizing the
situation, but also brought negative consequences." This statement is very
vague. What positive effects did the "Three Supports and Two Armies"
play, and what negative consequences did it bring, etc., need specific analysis
in the study of the "Cultural Revolution".
Mao Zedong supported the "rebels" to
"rebel" and "seize power" in the early days of the
"Cultural Revolution", which caused huge social turmoil, and
"military struggles" and "party battles" abounded. In this
extremely chaotic situation, the military's involvement in local work will
undoubtedly have a positive and positive effect on stabilizing the national
situation. The army has done a lot of work in such a complex environment,
stabilizing the social order and reducing the loss of people's lives and
property. The stable situation has enabled the gradual recovery of industrial
and agricultural production that had been interrupted, and enabled the operation
of various tasks such as transportation, finance, and construction across the
country. These are the credits of the "three arms and two armies". Of
course, there are many problems in the process of "Three Supports and Two
Armies", because this is not a "cure the root solution" in the
first place.
It should be pointed out that the "Three
Supports and Two Armies" is not at all Mao Zedong's
"far-sightedness", but a coping measure after the chaotic and passive
situation. In the process of arranging the "Three Supports and Two
Armies", Lao Mao has actually been taking one step at a time, which
belongs to "crossing the river by feeling the stones", which fully
demonstrates the passivity of the "Three Supports and Two Armies".
From the whole process of "Three Supports and
Two Armies", it can be clearly seen that its decision-making power is
completely in the hands of Mao Zedong, and all important decisions come from
Mao Zedong. During the "Cultural Revolution", there was an official
slogan written into various documents: "The Chinese People's Liberation
Army was created by Chairman Mao himself and directly commanded by Vice
Chairman Lin." Mao Zedong himself expressed dissatisfaction with the
second half of this slogan: "The people who created the People's Liberation
Army and led our army can create and lead, but can't command? They separate
creation and command, so can't the founders command? Huh?" Actually, this
slogan is a false proposition. Because the direct commander of the People's
Liberation Army has always been only one person, but this person is not Lin
Biao, but Mao Zedong. Lin Biao is only the vice chairman of the Military
Commission, and he is a vice chairman who does not have any real power. On top
of Lin Biao was Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, who
held all the power. The power-hungry Mao Zedong especially valued military
power. When he "retired to the second line", he could hand over part
of his party power and economic power, but the chairman of his military commission
never "retired to the second line". He never relaxed his military
power for a day, and never allowed anyone to get involved. When to use the
army, in which direction to use it, and how to use it can only be decided by
Mao Zedong. The process of "Three Supports and Two Armies" shows that
the so-called "party commanding the gun" and "the party's
absolute leadership over the army" are actually "Mao commanding the
gun" and "Mao's absolute leadership over the army".
This leads to all major issues related to the army,
such as the fact that the entire army entered emergency combat readiness on
October 18, 1969, which is still being stirred up by many people. The important
use of senior military leaders, such as Li Desheng, Ji Dengkui) or overthrow
(such as He Long, Luo Ruiqing, Xiao Hua, Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, Fu Chongbi,
etc., the proposal and abrupt end of "pull a small number of people in the
army", etc., are all Mao Zedong alone had the final say. Therefore, to
study the "Cultural Revolution", it is necessary to understand the
performance and role of the army in the entire process of the "Cultural
Revolution", as well as the ins and outs of the army's activities. If you
see a person wearing a military uniform and call it "Lin Biao's
forces", Or as soon as a person in military uniform was "knocked
down" and said that Lin Biao did it, this turned the serious history into
a child's play, and it is bound to draw conclusions that are opposite to each
other.
After the implementation of the "Three
Supports and Two Armies", military cadres have fully entered the various
fields and systems of the party, government, and education, and have grasped
considerable real power. When the Ninth National Congress of the Communist
Party of China was in session, the venue was full of soldiers. In view of this,
some people say that "Lin Biao's power has expanded", which is
absurd. There are too many soldiers, and their participation in the core
departments of the party and government is of course very taboo in modern
politics. But who caused it? It was Mao Zedong. You must never see these people
wearing the same clothes as Lin Biao, and say that they are "Lin Biao's
forces." In fact, the vast majority of military cadres have no direct
relationship with Lin Biao. Some people say this on purpose, just to create
charges for the downfall of Lin Biao.
Mao Zedong let a group of workers and soldiers
march into the ministries and commissions of the State Council, into the
provincial and municipal committees, into the dignified institutions of higher learning,
into factories, enterprises and rural areas, to issue orders and be the masters
of the country. Is there any shadow of the legal system? "Military
Propaganda Teams" and "Worker Propaganda Teams" stationed in
universities, workers and the People's Liberation Army "go to
universities, manage universities, and reform universities with Mao Zedong
Thought", and "the working class ascends to the stage of struggle,
criticism, and reform of the superstructure", making a science The chief
(Chi Qun) and a confidential officer (Xie Jingyi) were in charge of China's two
highest institutions of learning, and a large number of universities were
relocated to remote mountain villages. All of this clearly showed that Mao
Zedong did not value education and was hostile to intellectuals. Criticizing
these policies is an indispensable and important aspect of completely negating
the "Cultural Revolution".
The army was forced to intervene in the work of the
local government bluntly, and the negative consequences were quite serious. Mao
Zedong's policies were wrong in themselves, and local officials at all levels
intensified their efforts to implement these policies. As a result, a large
number of local cadres and the masses suffered. Coupled with the lack of local
work experience of military cadres, layman leaders are expert and command
blindly, which caused many unnecessary and man-made difficulties and losses.
The members of the army participating in the "Three Branches and Two
Armies" are mixed. If the person in charge of the army assigned to a unit
has better personal qualities and a higher level of policy, the unit will
suffer less trouble and the masses will suffer less; If the personal quality of
the person in charge of the army is bad, and one faction is pulled against
another, then the masses of this unit will suffer.
A large number of military cadres transferred to
work in the local area, especially the high-level organs of the party and the
state, and even approached the "center" (all those who entered the
central ministries and commissions) or entered the "imperial palace"
(like Wang Liangen went to the central office). The situation is actually quite
complicated and dangerous. "A companion is like a tiger", but these
generals who stayed in the barracks all their lives did not understand the
power of it, and many tragedies were caused as a result. Although they worked
diligently, many of them were falsely accused of being Lin Biao, the buddies or
remnants of the "Gang of Four", or regarded as "three kinds of
people", and suffered unfair injustice. Those who died were unclear, such
as Li Zhen, deputy political commissar and director of the Political Department
of the Shenyang Military Region, and Wang Liangen, deputy director of the
Political Department of the Nanjing Military Region. However, those who worked
in the army safely or those who returned to the army from the "three
branches and two armies" early, most of them were able to "land
safely" and enjoy their old age. From time to time, it is embarrassing!
Lin Huiting continued:
Summarizing the experience and lessons of this
period of history has made us realize more clearly that the army should be a
force to defend the country, and it must not be a private armed force of the
party and a person, let alone a weapon to defeat political opponents. Although
the military's involvement in politics played a certain positive role in a
specific historical period like the "Cultural Revolution", it caused
endless troubles. Whether it was the "Three Branches and Two Armies"
during the "Cultural Revolution" or the "June 4th Incident"
led by Deng Xiaoping later, we can see its negative and even bad consequences.
These lessons all tell us a universal truth - it is absolutely impossible not
to take the road of "nationalization of the military".
Chai Jianmin said to He Jiafu: Mr. He, the common
experience of you and me clearly let us see this society clearly. After I
leave, you have to treat yourself well. I believe that your children
Nanyangsheng, Nanliwa and Nanshanyun will take good care of you. After I go to
Hong Kong, I will definitely remember you and tell me if you have any
difficulties.
Chai Jianmin smiled at Lin Huiting again and said:
Thank you for taking a lesson on the history of the Cultural Revolution before
I went to Hong Kong. We are all elderly people in their early 90s. The biggest
difference from today's young people is that we understand what politics is,
and young people pay attention to it. It's just money and material, ideals and
beliefs that are changing in our descendants. I agree with Mr. He's opinion,
let's count it as long as you live.
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