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Pan Guangfu said to the three elderly people who
chatted with him, Chai Jianmin, He Jiafu, and Li Tiandao: "The meeting of
7,000 people held in early 1962 was the fuse to launch the Cultural Revolution.
It quickly spread from the central government to the local areas. What benefits
did the party, the country, and the people bring, on the contrary, it caused
great turmoil across the country. Comrade Mao is also in a difficult
situation.”
Faced with these unavoidable problems, Mao Zedong
knew very well that tens of millions of people starved to death across the
country, and the "Xinyang incident" occurred. In this way, almost all
women wore white shoes, and even vicious incidents of "cannibalism"
occurred, just like Liu Shaoqi It is said that in the feudal society of China,
it is necessary to "submit a letter" and issue a "crime has been
ordered". As the instigator of this series of huge disasters, as the
supreme leader of the entire party, he undoubtedly bears the main
responsibility that cannot be shirked. The question is, in what way and to what
extent does he shoulder these responsibilities, what do other people in the
party core think about his mistakes and responsibilities, and what do the
leaders at all levels of the party think? Among these mistakes, Mao Zedong had
no idea what people would think, how to do, and how to treat him.
But Mao Zedong was Mao Zedong after all. He does
not want to cover up or cover up these sharp and unavoidable contradictions and
problems, he does not want the Congress of Seven Thousand People to go through
the motions in the direction of solving the so-called problems of decentralization
and centralization, he does not want to deceive himself and others, he wants to
completely solve these problems figure out. Of course, these thoughts of Mao
Zedong probably became clear quickly after reading the first two parts of the
draft report of the conference that was hastily sent to him for review before
the meeting.
This report was drafted by Liu Shaoqi and Deng
Xiaoping, and a special drafting team was set up for this purpose. How to write
this report? In fact, at the small central working meeting on December 20
before the congress, Mao Zedong set the tone for the congress, and of course he
also set the tone for the report. What kind of tone is this? That is to say,
the situation is basically good, mistakes are being corrected, and it is better
than last year. The past experience and lessons mainly have a general line, but
lack a complete set of specific policies. In other words, the correctness of
the three red flags cannot be doubted; The central government should take
responsibility first, followed by provincial, prefectural, and county
committees.
It can be seen that according to this tone, the
evil consequences caused by the experiment of the three red flags will not rise
to the height of the wrong line, and Mao Zedong's supremacy in the party will
not be shaken. This is the bottom line that Mao Zedong insisted on. As long as
this bottom line is not broken, Mao Zedong will sooner or later prepare to
retreat across the board. He not only wants the central government to bear the
responsibility for the serious mistakes caused by the three red flags, but also
prepares to bear the main responsibility. If he does not do this, he will not
be able to If we continue to maintain the authority and prestige in the party,
we will not be able to win the trust of the party members and grassroots cadres
in the party. Mao Zedong is very clear about the pros and cons.
On the one hand, Mao Zedong blew the wind to the
members of the Standing Committee, the Politburo, and the secretaries of the
Provincial Party Committee, set the tone, and showed his "bottom
line". He no longer worried that the conference report would go against
the tone he set, and he no longer worried that the conference would deviate
from the expected track.
Of course, in general, the report did not break
through Mao Zedong's bottom line, and was drafted in accordance with Mao's
tone, but there were some ambiguous inclinations in the consideration of some
of the "key words", and some ambiguous intentions that were difficult
to distinguish. Mao Zedong was surprised and disturbed. And all of this is
related to Liu Shaoqi's "tough" attitude in presiding over the
drafting of the report.
In the drafting of the report, Liu Shaoqi was
uncharacteristically demanding many times that the report should "tell
enough about the achievements and fully explain the shortcomings",
emphasizing that "tell as much as possible about the mistakes and
shortcomings of the past four years, speak freely, don't hesitate,...be
vigorous Medicine", and pointed out that the mistakes of the four years
were related to the excessive struggle within the party since the Lushan
Conference in 1959, the lack of democratic life, and only criticizing the right
but not the left. Liu Shaoqi's attitude was reflected in the first draft of the
report, and there were the following "notes" that were not in harmony
with Mao Zedong's "tune": For example, the achievements since the
"Great Leap Forward" were not highlighted or mentioned separately;
All since the "Great Leap Forward" and so on. According to Mao
Zedong's keen political sense honed over the years of political struggle,
although he could not find any obvious "big mistakes", he could smell
the seriousness of the situation and had an ominous premonition of "fire
in the backyard". Therefore, Mao Zedong decided to submit the report to
the General Assembly for discussion.
Mao Zedong wanted Chen Yun to speak, and hoped that
he would express his complete opinions, at least because of the following
psychological factors:
First, although he was under a lot of pressure at
the meeting, the tone set by the meeting did not depart from his general idea,
that is, the economic situation has receded to the bottom and started to pick
up. The most difficult period has passed, and the next We should formulate a
10-year plan and work hard. Although Mao Zedong was very confident about this
basic estimate and general idea, he was not sure and was actually very
unsteady. Therefore, he hoped that Chen Yun would speak and support his
judgment and views. With the approval of the number one economic expert in the
party, it was like a reassurance that he would be much more confident. At the
same time, the more important thing is to be able to calm down those who
disapprove or support him in the party and convince them;
Second, did Mao Zedong ever think that Chen Yun
would disapprove of his judgment and ideas? Of course I have thought about it,
and I must have sufficient mental preparation. Even so, Mao Zedong hoped that
Chen Yun would express his objections without reservation. In fact, Liu Shaoqi,
the number two figure in the party, had already embarrassed Mao Zedong with his
speech, and another Chen Yun was nothing. If Chen Yun's objection was really
justified, Mao Zedong could still adjust his thinking, correct his judgment,
and take the initiative. In the past few years, Mao Zedong walked Maicheng on
the general line of national economic work and left many lessons. He will never
continue to be obsessed and follow Maicheng to the end.
Therefore, if Chen Yun really confides his true
thoughts at the meeting, it is estimated that Mao Zedong will listen to his
opinions and make some adjustments to the original general thinking on the
premise of sticking to his own bottom line, instead of developing as later.
Chen Yun didn't speak at the meeting, but actually revealed his thoughts at the
Xilou meeting half a month later, and the tone was quite different from Mao
Zedong's tone at the meeting of 7,000 people. As a result, Mao Zedong was very
passive and very annoyed.
Third, no matter whether Chen Yun sings praises or
sings an anti-tune, among the core, high-level and middle-level party cadres
present at the meeting, some people will resonate and some people will oppose
it. The division of lines and the balance of power between the two lines of
thinking, two points of view, and two judgments within the party will appear in
Mao Zedong's vision at a glance. This point is crucial to how Mao Zedong sticks
to his bottom line, how to maintain his authority, how to adjust his strategy, and
how to start the struggle within the party. However, Chen Yun refused to speak,
which made Mao Zedong very surprised and uneasy. In the premonition that a new
power game within the party is coming in the depths of his consciousness, Chen
Yun's reticence to speak is a disturbing, confusing and even unpredictable
blind spot and unknown.
But Mao Zedong's bottom line was broken by these
top leaders of the CCP, and he was very angry.