Wake up（152）

 

152

 

After He Jiafu and Li Tiandao met again and chatted about the past of the Great Leap Forward and the "communist style", two more guests came to He Jiafu's house, namely Chai Jianmin and Pan Guangfu.

Pan Guangfu's father, Pan Renshu, Chai Jianmin and He Jiafu all joined the army when they were drafting young men in the Republic of China. During the Cultural Revolution, Pan Renshu was once again under political attack because he had participated in the national army in history.

To Li Tiandao's surprise, he knew Pan Guangfu's mother Mai Shu. Mai Shu once had a brief history of first love with Li Tiandao. But Mai Shu's father, Mai Changhong, was a veteran cadre of the Red Army. Mai Changhong prevented their marriage. Since then they have no contact, but Li Tiandao knows that Mai Shu is married to Pan Renshu. Unexpectedly, Pan Guangfu in front of him was the son of Mai Shu and Pan Renshu.

In the ensuing conversation, Li Tiandao learned something about Mai Shu.

Pan Guangfu was born in 1964. Pan Guangfu is smart and studious. Pan Renshu taught him to study the thought of Laozi and Confucius, and asked him to be loyal to the emperor and serve the country. However, although his grandfather Mai Changhong was a veteran cadre of the Red Army, he always advised Pan Renshu to stay away from politics and not to believe in the so-called teachings of Confucius and Mencius.

Why did Mai Changhong ask Pan Renshu to stay away from politics? Because Mai Changhong experienced things like the Four Cleanups and the Cultural Revolution, he was hit by politics. Mai Changhong talked about these things with Pan Guangfu's father, Pan Renshu.

Mai Shu has a gentle personality. She loves her father, but also opposes his straightforwardness and recklessness. In the end, Mai Changhong became farther and farther away from politics, seeing politics as the bane of society.

Mai Changhong once told Pan Renshu about the pre-Cultural Revolution and the Siqing. At that time, Pan Guangfu knew more or less about some of the past.

Mai Changhong said: Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi had serious differences on the issue of "four clean-ups". At the same time, Lin Biao appeared.

In September 1959, within a few days of Lin Biao presiding over the work of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, he proposed at the enlarged meeting of the Military Commission that "studying the works of Comrade Mao Zedong is a shortcut to learning Marxism-Leninism" and that Mao Zedong Thought "develops Marxism-Leninism comprehensively and creatively." "Study Mao Zedong's works can be profitable" and other high-level theories with strong pragmatism. On September 30 of the same year, Lin Biao published the article "Holding High the Party's General Line and the Red Banner of Mao Zedong's Military Thought and Striding Forward".

As early as the 1960s, Mao Zedong considered the whole country to learn from the People's Liberation Army. In carrying out the "Four Clean-ups" campaign, Mao Zedong also requested that it be propagated and implemented in the army.

In the spring of 1960, Lin Biao went to the grass-roots company to promote the study of Chairman Mao's works to "study with problems, learn and apply them flexibly, learn when you need them urgently, and get immediate results, and work hard on the word 'use'". A 25-word pragmatic learning program.

On the morning of April 30, 1960, the 26th regular meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission, He Long, Luo Ronghuan, Ye Jianying, Luo Ruiqing, Liu Yalou, Zhang Aiping, and Liang Biye attended the meeting.

At the meeting, Luo Ronghuan pointed out that the formulation of "learning with problems" was inappropriate and asked for revision. Lin Biao said impatiently, "What do you think is the best way to study the Fa? No, just change it!" None of the other attendees made a sound.

Luo Shuai continued: "To study Chairman Mao's works, we must learn fundamentally, learn the essence of spirit, integrate them, and learn the standpoint, viewpoint, and method of Mao Zedong Thought. We must also closely connect with reality."

Luo Ronghuan was the director of the General Political Department appointed by Mao Zedong. Studying Chairman Mao's works is a big matter. Of course, the General Political Department should take care of it, and the director of the General Political Department should take care of it even more. Luo Ronghuan's idea is contrary to Lin Biao's. Lin Biao's face changed when he heard this. He rudely interrupted Luo Shuai's speech, "Okay, what are you talking about? The meeting is over!" After saying that, he got up and walked away. Luo Ronghuan was so angry that he trembled all over. The other veterans and generals present at the meeting were dumbfounded, not knowing why.

On the major political issue of studying Mao Zedong's works, Luo Lin had a principled disagreement. Lin Biao insisted on going his own way, completely ignoring Luo Shuai's correct opinion.

From May 11, 1960, the "Liberation Army Daily" published Mao Zedong's quotations every day. Continue to promote "learning with problems" and "using learning and application".

Luo Ronghuan insisted on the principle and reported to Deng Xiaoping the wrong practice of "learning with problems". Deng Xiaoping felt that the issue was important, and brought it to a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee for discussion. The comrades in the secretariat unanimously agreed with Luo Ronghuan's opinion and disapproved of "learning with problems". Lin Biao felt a lot of pressure, and was at a disadvantage in another contest with Luo Ronghuan. Lin Biao had a ghost in his heart. He said to the staff around him: "I have nothing to do. If I have an accident, I will bear it alone. I won't implicate you"!

Luo Ronghuan, Mao Zedong's close comrade-in-arms, participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising and was an intellectual. Lin Biao's old partner. During the Anti-Japanese War, Lin Biao was the commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, and Luo Ronghuan was the political commissar. In August 1945, the Anti-Japanese War ended. In September, Chairman Mao of the Party Central Committee sent Lin Biao to the Northeast. At the same time, four Politburo members, Peng Zhen, Chen Yun, Gao Gang, and Zhang Wentian, went to the Northeast. Lin Biao was a member of the Central Committee at that time.

In May 1946, Mao Zedong said in a telegram to Lin Biao: "All military and political command power on the front belongs to you and should not be dispersed." It showed a high degree of trust in Lin Biao. On June 16, 1946, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China made a decision to appoint Lin Biao as Secretary of the Northeast Bureau, Commander-in-Chief and Political Commissar of the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army, integrating military and political power in one person.

Soon, the Party Central Committee appointed Luo Ronghuan as the political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army. Therefore, people habitually call it "Lin Luo Yi". However, Lin Biao disagreed with this formulation. He said: "Lin Luo has never been one, but separated"!

In the Liaoshen Campaign, Lin Biao and Mao Zedong had many disagreements on how to eliminate the main force of Jiang's army and how to fight. In November 1945, Lin Biao did not implement Mao Zedong's intention to fight the Kuomintang army in Jinzhou. In April 1946, Mao Zedong strictly ordered Lin Biao to stick to Siping and fight for every inch of land. But Lin Biao stayed until May and gave up Siping. In August and October 1948, when he attacked Jinzhou, Lin Biao hesitated twice. After Mao Zedong sternly criticized him as "very wrong" and "very rash", Lin Biao began to wake up and admit his mistakes. In November 1948, when Chiang Kai-shek sent more troops to Huludao, Lin Biao was shaken again. Lin Biao was psychologically afraid of attacking Jinzhou City. At this critical moment, Luo Ronghuan resolutely implemented Mao Zedong's intentions and fought hard according to reason, thereby strengthening Lin Biao's determination to attack Jinzhou, and won the victory, laying the foundation for the complete victory of the "Liaoshen Campaign".

Once, Luo Ronghuan went to Lin Biao's home to report on work, just in time to catch up with a naval leader who was also present. The naval leader said, "Recently Luo Shuai gave a speech on the Fujian front."

Lin Biao said, "He is an old patient, he doesn't pay attention to physical rest, why is he running around?" He also asked in a strange way: "What high opinion does Luo Shuai have?"

Naval leaders report "Luo Shuai proposed that in 1961 the work center of the whole army was "four grasps and one investigation" (four grasps: grasping ideas, grasping training, grasping style, and grasping life. Investigation: the style of Daxing investigation and research).

Lin Biao didn't take it seriously, "What are the four arrests and one investigation? It was not a mistake to say that in those years, but it couldn't solve any problems." He also said, "Don't listen to him, listen to me."

When Luo Ronghuan was the director of the General Political Department, he once advocated that the leading cadres of the garrison troops should care about local work, can discuss it, and can make suggestions to the local party committee to facilitate military and political unity. But Lin Biao objected, saying that this was "shooting the local area", "the idea is wrong", "isn't this anti-party"? Mao Zedong knew about this, and he affirmed Luo Ronghuan's opinion.

Mao Zedong said: "Why can't we discuss it? They (referring to the leading cadres of the army) are all members of the East China Bureau, and some are members of the Central Committee. They have opinions, why can't they raise them? I disagree with Lin Biao's opinion." This time, Luo Ronghuan had the upper hand again. When Luo confronted Lin, Luo always had the upper hand, and Lin Biao harbored a grudge and waited for an opportunity to retaliate.

Lin Biao said that "Lin and Luo are not integrated" has historical reasons as well as inconsistencies on other issues. Rather than saying "Lin Luo is one", it is better to say "same bed with different dreams" or "appears to be in harmony with each other".

In 1963, when Luo Ronghuan was critically ill with uremia, Lin Biao never went to see him, nor did he send anyone to visit him, and he was indifferent. The decades-old comrades who have shared weal and woe are so unfeeling, it is confusing and frightening. When Luo Ronghuan was dying, he said to Liu Yalou and Xiao Hua: "I, the director of the General Political Department, is still illegal."

After Luo Ronghuan passed away, the Party Central Committee decided to hold a public sacrifice. On the day of the commemoration, almost all the leaders of the party and the state, as well as the leaders of the democratic parties, came, but Lin Biao did not come. Lin Biao showed extreme uneasiness and capriciousness on the issue of participating in Luo Ronghuan's sacrifice. He changed his mind three times in less than half an hour. Sometimes Luo Ruiqing was notified that he was coming, and sometimes he said that he could not come because he was "in poor health". So three times, in the end still did not come.

Mai Changhong is a veteran cadre of the Red Army, and has been in the four fields since then. He is Lin Biao's old subordinate, so he naturally stands on Lin Biao's side.

After Lin Biao's accident, Mai Changhong was hit, which is why he asked Pan Renshu to stay away from politics. Pan Renshu also talked about these things to Pan Guangfu.