Wake up（355）

 

355

 

Liu Xiaosheng recalled: On June 9, 1989, Deng Xiaoping published a public speech "Speech at the Meeting with Cadres of the Martial Law Force in the Capital" and criticized the purpose of the demonstrators. Deng Xiaoping mentioned in his talk on June 9: "Let everyone see who the People's Liberation Army really is, whether there is a bloodbath on Tiananmen Square, and who is the one who shed blood. When this issue is clarified, we will take the initiative."

On June 9, Deng Xiaoping, accompanied by other high-level officials, went to Huairen Hall in Zhongnanhai to meet senior cadres of the martial law troops. This was the first time Deng Xiaoping appeared in public since the students started the demonstration.

On June 9, 1989, Deng Xiaoping's "Speech When He Received the Cadres of the Martial Law Force in the Capital" was actually the official tone:

 

This storm will come sooner or later. This is determined by the international climate and China's own microclimate. It must come, and it does not depend on people's will. It is just a matter of time, big or small. But now, it is more beneficial to us. The most beneficial thing is that we have a large number of old comrades who are still alive. They have experienced many turmoil and understand the stakes of the matter. They support resolute action against the riots. Although some comrades did not understand it for a while, they will eventually understand and support the central government's decision.

 

… Once things exploded, it was clear. Their fundamental slogans are mainly two, one is to overthrow the (Chinese) Communist Party, and the other is to overthrow the socialist system. Their purpose is to establish a bourgeois republic completely subject to the West. The people demand anti-corruption, and of course we accept it. We should also accept the so-called anti-corruption slogans put forward by those with ulterior motives as good words. Of course, this slogan is just a foil for them, and its core is to overthrow the (Chinese) Communist Party and overthrow the socialist system. ...Is the basic point of reform and opening up wrong? correct. Without reform and opening up, how could we be where we are today?

 

... what shall we do in the future? I said, the basic line, guidelines, and policies we have formulated before will continue to be carried out unswervingly. …We must unswervingly implement a series of lines, principles, and policies formulated since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Party. We must conscientiously sum up experience, continue to adhere to what is right, correct what is wrong, and work harder on what is not enough. In short, we must summarize the present and see the future.

 

After Deng Xiaoping received his speech at the cadres above the martial law force in the capital, Chen Xitong made a "Report on the Situation of Stopping Unrest and Calming Counter-Revolutionary Riots".

According to the report:

The official position of the Chinese government on the June 4th incident is that the use of force is necessary to control the "political turmoil" and ensure the stable society necessary for economic success; Chinese leaders, including Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, have been When reporters ask such questions, they constantly reiterate the official position of the Chinese government.

Chen Xitong's "Report on the Situation of Stopping Unrest and Calming Counter-Revolutionary Riots" was first mentioned in "A Brief History of the Communist Party of China" published by People's Publishing House and CCP History Publishing House. The Test of Political Turmoil and the Completion of Rectification" is an official record of the June Fourth Incident. This historical material refers to the June 4 incident as "the political disturbance of 1989", and includes relevant content about the incident including the death of Hu Yaobang and the April 26 editorial. In the following subsections of the article, the reflections and related measures of the Chinese authorities are also recorded, involving the solution to the corruption problem and the adjustment of economic policies.

At the same time, the Chinese government has continued to control public perception of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. When this is mentioned, the print media must be consistent with the Chinese government's version of the Tiananmen Square incident. In addition, the Chinese government also prepared a white paper to explain the government's view on the protests. Afterwards, anonymous individuals within the Chinese government shipped these files overseas and published the "Tiananmen Papers" by Public Issues in 2001.

On the eve of the 30th anniversary of the June 4 incident, Wei Fenghe, Minister of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, said at the Shangri-La Dialogue that "the June 4 incident was a turmoil and turmoil. The central government took decisive measures to stop and quell this turmoil. Stablize.

In the Sixth Plenary Session of the Nineteenth Central Committee, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proposed an official resolution after reviewing the period of June Fourth. "Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party's Centennial Struggle" pointed out this incident in a special paragraph, and condemned the anti-communist and anti-socialist external forces. , to emphasize the role of the government in "resisting risks and managing complex situations". The resolution roughly described the international climate (the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the drastic changes in Eastern Europe) and the domestic microclimate (many problems of economic reform) at the end of the 20th century. The people unequivocally opposed turmoil, defended socialism, and safeguarded the fundamental interests of the people, and made an overall conclusion based on a series of subsequent political achievements.

In his speech, Deng Xiaoping called the soldiers of the People's Liberation Army who died as a result of the June 4 incident "martyrs", and pointed out that the purpose of the demonstrations was to overthrow the current government, hoping to further "establish a bourgeois republic completely subject to the West."

Deng Xiaoping believed that the reason why the demonstrators kept emphasizing related complaints, including official corruption, was to cover up their real motive of trying to replace the current socialist system. He later expressed this point of view: "This whole thing is the plan of the Western world, which is still clinging to imperialism. They are trying to get all the socialist countries to abandon the socialist road one by one, and then lead them to another world full of international capital and monopoly capital. the path of doctrine."

However, many government officials at the time also had different views on the June 4 incident. Among them, Chen Xitong regretted the bloodshed many times before his death in 2012, while Bao Tong, who was Zhao Ziyang's political secretary at the time, repeatedly appealed to the Chinese government The demonstrations should be vindicated.

Before his death in 1998, Yang Shangkun told military doctor Jiang Yanyong that the June 4 incident was the most serious mistake made by the Chinese authorities, and he believed that one day the incident would be corrected.

At the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Zhao Ziyang, who opposed the implementation of martial law, was removed from his position on the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. The Politburo Standing Committee was dismissed.

However, in contrast to Zhao Ziyang who was subsequently placed under house arrest and lasted until his death in 2005, Hu Qili still retained his party membership and was re-appointed as Vice Minister of the Ministry of Machinery and Electronics Industry after "changing his opinion".

After Wan Li, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, who also has reform ideas, returned to Beijing Capital International Airport from overseas ahead of schedule, the Chinese government detained him on health grounds and placed him under house arrest. Wan Li was also released from house arrest after "changing his own mind". After that, Wan Li continued to serve as the chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress until his retirement in 1993 after his term expired.

The occurrence of the June 4 incident directly led to the stagnation of reform and opening up, especially the reform of China's political system. Zhao Ziyang was removed from all positions, including Hu Qili. Many officials who sympathized with the protests were also removed or demoted. Jiang Zemin was promoted to the new CCP The general secretary of the Central Committee and the core of the third generation leadership.

Jiang Zemin replaced Zhao Ziyang as the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. He won the support of conservative forces because of his handling of reform-oriented publications in Shanghai and his active response to the April 26 editorial.

The student movement protests also amended the separation of powers originally adopted in accordance with the 1982 Constitution and the usual practice. In the past, in order to prevent Mao Zedong’s personal rule and related excesses, the Chinese Communist Party decided to abolish Mao Zedong’s lifelong chairmanship of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China duty. At the same time, the post of President of the People's Republic of China, which was abolished in 1975, was re-established and listed as a virtual head of state without real power. At the same time, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Premier of the State Council, and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission who actually have political power are divided into different positions. person in charge. However, during the June 4th incident, Yang Shangkun, who was the state president, held military power concurrently as vice-chairman and secretary-general of the Central Military Commission, and openly broke with another vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Zhao Ziyang, and turned to advocate the use of military force Li Peng, Premier of the State Council, and Deng Xiaoping, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, have made official policy inconsistent and incoherent and clearly impeded the exercise of power.

For this reason, and taking into account the identity needs of foreign exchanges, since 1993, the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and the chairman of the Central Military Commission have concurrently served as the state president.

After this turmoil, hardliners rose up, and the reform and opening up policy stagnated, and it was not resumed until Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in 1992; the human rights, civil governance policies and other political reforms that were gradually opened up in the 1980s were also suspended.

On October 31, 1989, the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress passed the Law of the People's Republic of China on Assembly, Procession and Demonstration. According to the Act, in principle, to hold an assembly, procession, or demonstration, an application must be made to the competent authority in accordance with the Act and permission must be obtained.

After June 4th, some people at home and abroad cited the "responsibility ethics" that politicians should have, and made negative comments on Zhao Ziyang's resignation. "Ethics of Responsibility". The assumptions of this evaluation are: First, if Zhao Ziyang had not visited North Korea at the critical moment in the early period of the 1989 Movement, the Politburo would not have been dominated by the conservative Li Peng, and his behind-the-scenes conspiracy to encourage Deng Xiaoping would have been difficult to succeed, namely the "4·26 Editorial" Perhaps it would not have been promulgated, and it would not have stimulated the students and led to the gradual escalation of the movement; secondly, if Zhao Ziyang had compromised with Deng Xiaoping in the middle of the movement, Deng Xiaoping would not have made up his mind to depose Zhao Ziyang. Fourth bloody case; Thirdly, as long as Zhao Ziyang attends the party, government and military meeting where martial law was declared according to Deng Xiaoping's wishes after the martial law was decided, even if the bloody case cannot be avoided, as long as Zhao Ziyang can keep his power, the post-June 4th repression can be weakened, Arrests and purges can also to some extent resist the full-scale counterattack of the extreme left against reforms. Not only can economic reforms maintain continuity, but political reforms will not stagnate for fifteen years. In other words, Zhao Ziyang's persistence on the issue of martial law is at least a sign of political immaturity.

If it is said that Zhao Ziyang's lack of obscurity after he became the general secretary was accused of being politically immature, then it is also a manifestation of political naivety to say that Zhao Ziyang insisted on his own views on the issue of martial law. Because, under the premise that China has embarked on the road of no return for reform and development, whether to agree to impose military martial law on the peaceful expression of public opinion is by no means a strategic dispute over how to deal with social crises, but a matter of fundamental political good and evil The big dispute between right and wrong. If he still blindly hides or compromises on this issue, Zhao Ziyang will no longer be an outlier among high-level CCP officials, but will be like other high-level officials in the dictatorship, reduced to an opportunistic politician who eliminates right and wrong, good and evil, even if If he keeps his power, he may no longer be the enlightened Zhao Ziyang who is determined to promote political democratization. What is more likely is that he will just become the second Jiang Zemin, the most common mediocre politician in the CCP's official circles.

Fortunately, through the test of right and wrong in the 1989 Movement, Zhao Ziyang's failure in the real power struggle won long-term political honor and moral resources, and also provided a reference for those high-ranking officials who "are in Cao Ying and their hearts are in Han" model of governance. In other words, Zhao Ziyang's performance on the June 4th issue can be regarded as the biggest anomaly among the previous party leaders in terms of the CCP's officialdom, and it has preserved political moral dignity for Chinese politicians.