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Senior
media people have one thing in common, that is, they are good at observing
society and life. Those political media people are most concerned about the
state power and the world situation, and they also pay special attention to the
life and death of politicians and anecdotes. Because grassroots people only
care about their own daily necessities, rice, oil, salt, soy sauce and vinegar,
they don’t understand the evolution of history and culture, and they don’t care
about the impact of political interference in life. Therefore, even if senior
media people say old things, in the eyes of grassroots groups But it's all
unheard of news.
When
Liu Xiaosheng, a senior media person, chatted with Lao Pantou and those young
people, he talked about Deng Xiaoping's death, and naturally turned old news
into news.
Deng
Xiaoping has not been seen in public since October 1, 1994. On December 12,
1996, Deng Xiaoping was admitted to the south building ward of the General
Hospital of the Chinese People's Liberation Army due to respiratory diseases.
From
January 1, 1997, the first program of China Central Television broadcast the
biographical documentary "Deng Xiaoping".
At the
beginning of February 1997, on the eve of the Spring Festival, Deng Xiaoping,
who was in a stable condition, went to visit Jiang Zemin, the then general
secretary of the CPC Central Committee, to convey his congratulations to the
people of all ethnic groups in the country, and hoped that the leadership of the
CPC Central Committee with Jiang Zemin at the core would The next step is to
"do well the two major events of resuming the exercise of sovereignty over
Hong Kong this year and the convening of the 15th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China."
On
February 19, 1997, on the thirteenth day of the first lunar month, Deng
Xiaoping's respiratory function had failed and he could only breathe with the
help of a machine; at 21:08 that night, the medical team announced the end of
rescue efforts, and Deng Xiaoping died at the age of 92.
What
did Deng Xiaoping think before he died? This is an interesting puzzle.
Mao
Zedong successively promoted Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Wang Hongwen, and Hua
Guofeng as successors, but the results ended in failure. Deng Xiaoping successively
promoted Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang as successors, but they also failed one
after another. Deng Xiaoping promoted Jiang Zemin again. Whether Jiang Zemin
would earnestly follow the domestic and foreign policy pioneered by Deng
Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping probably was not completely at ease until the last
moment of his death. Jiang Zemin's ascension to power was closely related to
the recommendation of Chen Yun and traditionalists Li Xiannian and Wang Zhen.
Deng Xiaoping tried to take down Jiang Zemin, but failed. Deng Xiaoping tried
to get Zhao Ziyang back again, but he didn't succeed.
Deng
Xiaoping had lingering fears about the so-called "unruly" reformers
of the CCP. If there was another hard-edged reformer, the CCP might split.
condemnation. Therefore, Deng Xiaoping adopted a compromise method, appointing
an alternate generation heir.
Deng
Xiaoping made Hu Jintao the leader of the Communist Party of China in 2002 by
appointing him from generation to generation. This should be mainly due to
multiple considerations.
First
of all, Hu Jintao can better continue the reform and opening-up line initiated
by Deng Xiaoping himself and the so-called reformers of the CCP, and integrate
China into the world through a large-scale market economy. This obviously put
pressure on Jiang Zemin.
Secondly,
Hu Jintao can maintain the balance among the various factions within the CCP,
so that the dilapidated behemoth of the CCP will not be completely split.
Again,
Deng Xiaoping skillfully repaid the two great favors he owed. Deng Xiaoping was
able to rely on the support of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Between 1974 and
1975, he had a brief history of being in charge of the daily work of the
country. A few years later, Deng Xiaoping came to the top again because several
bigwigs from the traditional party of the CCP drove out the bosses. Mao's
designated successor, Hua Guofeng, gave Deng Xiaoping a historic opportunity to
flex his muscles again. Of course Deng Xiaoping was also the only best
candidate of that era.
Why did
Deng Xiaoping adopt Song Ping's suggestion and choose Hu Jintao as the next
generation leader of the CCP? Generally speaking, it was because there was no
other suitable candidate at that time.
Regarding
Hu Jintao's becoming the fourth generation leader of the CCP, there has always
been a saying in the outside world: he is Deng Xiaoping's designated successor.
Because Hu Jintao has this basis of legitimacy, even if Jiang Zemin does not
like him, he cannot be replaced by Zeng Qinghong. Although so far there is no evidence
to support this statement, but over time, as more people say it, it seems to
have become an accepted fact.
Before
Deng Xiaoping was alive, he designated Hu Jintao to be in power after Jiang
Zemin to support the Communist Party. This statement is a bit like the story in
"The Romance of the Three Kingdoms": Zhuge Liang appointed Jiang Wan
before his death, and after Jiang Wan, Fei Wei was his successor to support the
small court of Han and Shu in the southwest. Although the new story is nice to
hear, it is a pity that it is not true.
The
matter had to start on the eve of the Twelfth National Congress of the
Communist Party of China 20 years ago. During the Sixth Plenary Session of the
Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China from June 27 to 29,
1982, the article "Promotion and Training of Young and Middle-aged Cadres
is an Urgent Matter" written by Chen Yun and the "Summary of the
Symposium on Retirement and Retirement of Veteran Cadres" drafted by him
were published. After the meeting, some participants stayed to participate in
the symposium of party committee secretaries of various provinces,
municipalities and autonomous regions.
On July
2, Chen Yun gave a speech at a symposium, emphasizing the objective existence
of the cadre team’s inadequacy. He said with some concern: Mentioning people
around the age of 50 may lead to fewer arguments, but mentioning people around
the age of 40 will lead to a lot of controversy and suspicion. Mention people
under the age of 40, there will be more doubts and arguments. That being the
case, why does the "Summary" still say "specially mention people
under the age of 40?" He asked himself and answered: first, he is young
and vigorous. The second is to cultivate consciously. After 3, 5, and 10 years,
consciously cultivate and select good people. The third is that there are
talents among people under the age of 40. Fourth, only people under the age of
40 can understand the thoughts and performances of young people in the early
days of the "Cultural Revolution".
After
Chen Yun's speech, Deng Xiaoping made an impromptu speech. He said solemnly:
"We have always said that this is a strategic issue that determines our
destiny. Now, it is very urgent to solve this problem. In three to five years,
if we do not solve this problem, there will be a disaster. He faced everyone
and asked: "Why did you stay here for two days after the plenary meeting
to discuss Comrade Chen Yun's two suggestions on promoting and training young
and middle-aged cadres and retiring veteran cadres? It is because this issue is
very urgent and very urgent. Important." After the Central Work Conference
last December, Comrade Chen Yun pointedly raised the issue of "selecting
young and middle-aged cadres not by tens or hundreds, but by tens of thousands."
"He mentioned it very well, and I agree." Because "I have had a
heart-to-heart relationship with Comrade Chen Yun. To be honest, as far as we
are concerned, we are really happy now that we are retiring." The task is
to solve this problem."
Shortly
after the meeting, on August 7, the Organization Department of the Central
Committee issued the "Notice on Implementing the Central Committee's
Instructions on Adjusting the Leading Group and Selecting Outstanding Young and
Middle-aged Cadres".
At the
Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in September
1982, among the 210 newly elected members of the Central Committee, the
youngest was Hu Jintao, deputy director of the Construction Committee of Gansu
Province, who was only 39 years old at the time.
On the
second day after the closing of the conference, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and
other leading comrades of the Central Committee specially received 39 newly
elected young and alternate Central Committee members. When they stepped into
the hall one by one, comrades from the Organization Department of the Central
Committee introduced the situation one by one. Deng, Chen and other old
comrades shook hands with these energetic young cadres one by one, looked at
them carefully, and showed satisfied smiles on their faces.
Regarding
this meeting, Xinhua News Agency described excitedly in a report titled
"Alternating the Old and the New, Carrying on the Past and Opening the
Future": "This is not an ordinary meeting, nor is it an ordinary
interview. Everyone is immersed in an extremely warm atmosphere. The old one
Generations of proletarian revolutionaries, these Chinese revolutionary
helmsmen who have guided this huge ship of China to break through the waves for
many years, are all full of joy today, holding the hands of every comrade who
walked in front of them. This is the cooperation and cooperation between the
old and new of our party. The alternating handshake is the handshake of the
revolutionary torch handed down by the older generation of proletarian
revolutionaries, and the handshake of the party’s infinite hope for young and
middle-aged cadres.”
Soon,
Hu Jintao, the 39-year-old youngest alternate member of the Central Committee,
was transferred from Gansu in the west to Beijing, the capital, to work on the
leadership of the Youth League Central Committee. From 1982 to 1985, he
successively served as secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of
the Communist Youth League, chairman of the All-China Youth Federation, and
First Secretary of the Central Secretariat. According to the decision of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, he worked from 1985 to 1992,
especially in the western region where the country is underdeveloped and the
conditions are difficult. The first secretary of the party committee. Together
with working in Gansu after leaving Tsinghua University, he has worked in the
western region for nearly 20 years and has demonstrated his leadership in all
aspects. At the National Representative Conference held in 1985, a group of
young leading cadres were elected to the Central Committee.
The
Beidaihe meeting in the summer of 1991 began to prepare candidates for the
central decision-making level of the 14th National Congress. The personnel
arrangement team consisted of Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Song Ping, and Bo Yibo, a
veteran of the Communist Party of China. At that time, Jiang Zemin and Li Peng
were both nominal, and Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun were the ones who really made
the final decision. The actual host was Song Ping, a member of the Politburo
Standing Committee in charge of organizational work, and Bo Yibo was in charge
of spreading the word between Deng and Chen.
At that
time, the central government considered the age structure of decision-makers
and decided to train a member of the Politburo Standing Committee who was about
50 years old. The candidates included Hu Jintao, Li Changchun and Wu Bangguo.
In the end, Hu Jintao was able to qualify, and it was Song Ping who played the
key role. Compared with Li Changchun and Wu Bangguo, Song Ping was more
familiar with Hu Jintao from Gansu. What's more, Li Changchun was only the
governor and deputy secretary of the provincial party committee of Henan
Province at that time; Besides, Hu Jintao is steady and modest, and has always
kept a low profile in his affairs. It's kind of like Song Pyung's own
character. Therefore, Song Ping, in the name of the personnel arrangement group
of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, proposed to the
Politburo Standing Committee, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun to select Hu Jintao as
the new Politburo Standing Committee.
At the
14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1992, Hu Jintao never
dreamed that he not only returned to Beijing, but also entered the center of
power, and was elected as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and
Secretary of the Central Secretariat.
Obviously,
the real power behind Hu Jintao's promotion this time is not Deng Xiaoping, but
Song Ping.
Who is
Song Ping? Few people know about his experience, perhaps it has something to do
with his low-key personality.
Song
Ping was born on April 30, 1917, formerly known as Song Yanping. Song Ping is a
resident of Daluozhuang Village, Zhaoxian Town, Ju County, Shandong Province.
He entered school at the age of 9, skipped grades, and soon finished elementary
and middle school. When my elder brother participated in a lottery draw by the
Universal Postal Union, he won a bonus of 300 yuan and gave the money to Song
Ping for him to go to school in Peiping. In this way, in 1934, Song Ping
entered the Agricultural College of Peking University to study; a year later,
he was admitted to the Department of Chemistry of Tsinghua University.
Song
Ping joined the Chinese National Liberation Vanguard, a student patriotic
organization led by the Communist Party of China in the spring of 1936; in
1937, he joined the Communist Party of China.
In
1938, went to Yan'an Marxist-Leninist College to study. After graduation, he
stayed at the school to work; successively served as the director of the
Education Department, the head of the Education Department, and the researcher
of the Central Party Affairs Research Office. In 1941, Song Ping was
transferred to the Assistant Secretary of the Propaganda Department of the
Southern Bureau of the Communist Party of China. Since then, he has
successively served as the director of the reference room of Chongqing
"Xinhua Daily", the secretary director of the editorial department,
and the secretary-general, and later became the head of the Chongqing branch of
Xinhua News Agency. After the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, he went to
Nanjing with Xinhua News Agency and served as the head of the Nanjing General
Branch.
During
the peace talks between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Song Ping
served as Zhou Enlai's political secretary. After the failure of the peace
talks, he was transferred back to the CCP-controlled area, participated in the
work of "Northeast Daily" in Harbin, and participated in the establishment
of "Harbin Daily". Later, he served as deputy secretary of the
Guxiang District Committee of Harbin City.
On
November 2, 1948, the People's Liberation Army captured Shenyang, and Song Ping
went to the city with the army to participate in the takeover work. The
Shenyang Municipal Working Committee established the Party Newspaper Committee,
composed of Song Li, Li Du, Liu Yaxiong, Song Ping, Zhu Weiren, Yu Beichen,
Chen Ruiguang, Zhang Chengmin, Chen Shunyao, Xue Guangjun, and Ye Ke, with Song
Li as the secretary and Li Du as the deputy secretary . On December 20, 1948,
"Worker's Daily", the official newspaper of the Municipal Working
Committee and the trade union newspaper, was founded on December 20, 1948. Li
Du was the president, Ye Ke was the vice president, Chen Shunyao was the
editor-in-chief, and he was a member of the Standing Committee of the Northeast
Federation of Trade Unions and the Propaganda Department. Deputy Minister Song
Ping and Acting Editor-in-Chief.
After
the founding of the People's Republic of China, Song Ping served as the
Minister of Culture and Education of the Northeast Federation of Trade Unions,
Secretary General of the Northeast Federation of Trade Unions, and Vice
Chairman of the Northeast Federation of Trade Unions. In 1952, he was transferred
to work at the central government, and successively served as director of the
Labor and Wage Bureau of the State Planning Commission, member of the State
Planning Commission, deputy minister of the Ministry of Labor, and deputy
director of the State Planning Commission.
In
1960, Song Ping was transferred to be a member of the Northwest Bureau of the
Communist Party of China and director of the Planning Committee of the
Northwest Bureau, and began to work in the Northwest region. In September 1963,
he served as the deputy director of the "Third-line Construction Committee
of the Northwest Bureau".
After
the "Cultural Revolution" began, Song Ping was marginalized. Later,
in order to develop production in Shaanxi Province, a "production
headquarters" was established, and Song Ping was appointed as a
consultant. In 1972, he served as secretary of the Gansu Provincial Committee
of the Communist Party of China and deputy director of the Provincial
Revolutionary Committee; in June 1977, he was promoted to first secretary of
the Gansu Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, director of the
Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and second political commissar of the
Lanzhou Military Region. After the publication of the article "Practice is
the only criterion for testing truth", Song Ping took the lead in leading
the Gansu Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China and held two
symposiums to study and discuss the issue of "truth standard"; this
is China's first provincial "truth standard" discussion.
From
1977 to 1981, when Song Ping served as the first secretary of the Gansu
Provincial Party Committee of the Communist Party of China, he vigorously
promoted and recommended Hu Jintao, then deputy director of the Gansu
Provincial Construction Committee, which laid the foundation for him to be the
general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and
become the fourth generation leader of the Communist Party of China. ,
Therefore, it is called "the biggest Bole in Chinese politics" by the
media.
In
1981, Song Ping returned to work at the central government again; he served as
deputy director of the State Planning Commission and deputy secretary of the
party group. In June 1983, he served as State Councilor and Director of the
State Planning Commission in the "cabinet" of Premier Zhao Ziyang.
Before the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in
1987, he took over party affairs and was transferred to the head of the
Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee; at the First Plenary
Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee, he was elected as a member of the
Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
From
the late 1940s to the early 1950s, and in the 1980s, Song Ping was Zhu Rongji's
superior and was considered one of Zhu Rongji's main officials.
After
the "June 4th Incident" subsided in 1989, high-level personnel of the
CCP were adjusted, and Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili, members of the Standing
Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, were dismissed. The
72-year-old Song Ping, Jiang Zemin, and Li Ruihuan were co-elected as the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the Fourth Plenary Session
of the Thirteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Member of
the Politburo Standing Committee (ranked fifth), entered the top leadership.
Become a national leader in one fell swoop.
Because
of Song Ping's relatively conservative political and economic ideas, he was
considered a supporter of the planned economy, and he was the main figure in
the Chen Yun and Li Xiannian camps along with Yao Yilin. After the June 4th
incident, it proposed to oppose peaceful evolution as one of the "two
centers".
On
October 19, 1992, 75-year-old Song Ping retired from the Standing Committee of
the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee after the First Plenary
Session of the 14th CPC Central Committee. However, after Xi Jinping came to
power, Song Ping made many public appearances, and was considered to be
"standing" for Xi Jinping's anti-corruption and poverty alleviation
work.
Song
Ping is the oldest living party and state leader, the only one who was born
before the 1920s, the only one who participated in the revolution during the
Yan'an period, and the first in the history of the Communist Party of China to
reach the age of 100. A member of the Politburo, a member of the Standing
Committee of the Politburo and a state-level leader.
Hu
Jintao was able to promote the central government from the northwest border,
without Song Ping's approval and support, it would have been impossible. Song
Ping's support for Hu Jintao was adopted by Deng Xiaoping for another reason.
It is said that it is related to Hu Jintao's decisive handling of the riots in
Lhasa, Tibet. At that time, Hu Jintao asked the central government for
instructions on how to deal with it, but the central government's opinion has
not been issued for a long time, and the riots intensified. "The general
is outside, and the king's order is not acceptable." Hu Jintao decided to
impose martial law without authorization, and sent troops to suppress it.
Afterwards, the central government affirmed his approach. This decisive style
is naturally appreciated by Lao Deng.
Hu
Jintao's position as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee does not
necessarily mean that he is already in the position of "prince
prince". It was not until 1997 that he appeared as the fourth-generation
successor of the CCP, serving as the vice chairman of the country and the first
vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. By this time Deng Xiaoping
had passed away. If Hu Jintao was Deng's designated successor, he should have
received these two positions before Deng Xiaoping's lifetime.
Hu
Jintao was identified as the successor. First, because he has already occupied
the highest position among the fourth-generation officials, it is logical that
he should be mentioned in the selection of the successor. The second is because
he has shown the political quality as a leader of the fourth generation. Hu
Jintao is prudent, pragmatic, good at thinking, sincere in dealing with people,
tolerant, daring to take responsibility, and most importantly, good at dealing
with complex issues. When the Sino-U.S. aircraft collided with each other,
there was a heated debate between the hawks and doves at the top of the CCP
about how to deal with it. Jiang Zemin, who was indecisive, was at a loss, and
finally handed it over to Hu Jintao to handle it himself. Hu Jintao made a
final decision and decided to return the opportunity to others to avoid further
expansion of the Sino-US conflict. It is not unrelated to this that the United
States later gave Hu Jintao extra-standard courtesy when he visited. The third
is because he can properly handle the relationship with the third generation of
leaders, especially the "Big Three" of Jiang, Li, and Zhu.
Liu
Xiaosheng told Lao Pantou and those young people: Li Peng and Hu Jintao came
out of the Songping system, and Zhu Rongji devoted himself to economic affairs.
There will be no conflicts with him. The key is Jiang Zemin. In the first five
years after Hu Jintao joined the Politburo, he was willing to act as Jiang
Zemin's first assistant, following the rules and never overstepping his
position. In the next five years, Hu Jintao catered to Jiang Zemin even more
tremblingly and cautiously. In 1998, Jiang Zemin proposed to "emphasize
politics, study, and righteousness." Hu Jintao personally led the national
"Three Emphasis" campaign. Later, he said that he must be called
Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents." If so, Jiang Zemin has no reason to
suppress him. In this way, Hu Jintao stepped onto the throne of the
fourth-generation leader step by step.
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